| Population (2012) | 9.54 million |
| Surface area | 450,295 km2 |
| Capital | Stockholm |
| GDP (PPP), per capita (Economist 2013) | USD43,710 |
| GDP (nominal), per capita (Economist 2013) | USD55,430 |
| Currency | Swedish Krona (SEK) |
| Corruption level (Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2012; 100 = very clean, 0 = highly corrupt) | 88 (world ranking: 4) |
| Current government | Centre-right coalition (the Moderate Party, the Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats) |
| Three largest cities | Stockholm, Gothenburg (Göteborg), Malmo (Malmö) |
| Baltic Sea coastal regions | Halland, Skåne, Blekinge, Kalmar, Gotland, Östergötland, Södermanland, Stockholm, Uppsala, Gävleborg, Västnorrland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten counties |
By Joakim Ekman
Sweden in 2013 may be described as a country muddling through. The ruling Centre-right coalition, headed by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, cannot muster a majority in parliament, whereas the main opposition, the Social Democratic Party, is still suffering from the problematic developments of recent years. The political newcomers, the populist far-right Sweden Democrats, have by no means become a legitimate coalition partner, even though the party’s popular support seems to be stable. For the next parliamentary elections in 2014, any outcome would seem possible. The economy will presumably continue to grow, but at a rather modest pace. The country’s commitment to Baltic Sea co-operation remains firm, even if it runs the risk of becoming too ambitious and ultimately being watered down, as it tends to encompass everything from strictly internal EU initiatives to foreign security concerns regarding Russia.
Government
Sweden is in between elections, a fact that might come as something of a relief to the ruling Centre-right coalition, as well as to the leftist-green bloc: ‘the Alliance’ remains a minority government, facing the potential challenge of the far-right populist Sweden Democrats becoming the fourth largest party in parliament in 2014, whereas the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party have yet to come up with a viable common agenda for the next parliamentary elections. Indeed, it is far from certain that there will in fact be a common electoral platform in 2014.
The last Swedish general elections entailed something of a disaster for the Social Democrats. The once-dominant party was defeated for the second time in a row by the remodelled ‘new Moderates’ and the centre–right coalition ‘the Alliance’, which is currently in office. As a result, party leader Mona Sahlin resigned in spring 2011. Her successor Håkan Juholt assumed office in March 2011, only to resign not even a year later, in January 2012, following massive internal opposition and unfavourable opinion ratings. On 29 January, former trade union leader Stefan Löfven replaced Juholt, which resulted in a temporary boost in support for the Social Democrats. However, Löfven kept a very low profile for most of 2012, and only after his formal appointment as party leader, at the Social Democrat party congress in early April 2013, has he entered the stage as the main opposition leader. As such, he tries to strike a balance between being an advocate of traditional social democratic values and a supporter of the industrial sector. In the spring of 2013, popular support for the Social Democrats was on the rise, according to various opinion polls.
2012 saw a few new faces in Swedish politics, in addition to Löfven. Just a couple of weeks before Juholt’s resignation, the Left Party chose a new leader as well to replace veteran Lars Ohly: Jonas Sjöstedt. Nonetheless, the party will have a hard time achieving more than about five per cent of the votes, as it had in the last elections.
As for the small parties within the ruling coalition, the party leaders have weathered their fair share of internal criticism. In early 2012, a moral conservative fraction within the Christian Democrats tried to ouster long time party leader Göran Hägglund. The attempt ultimately failed, but indicated a divided party and a general impression among the own ranks that Hägglund stands out as too dependent on the main party of the coalition government, the Moderates.
Just like the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party seems to moving downwards below the four per cent threshold, which would prevent them from entering parliament in 2014. Party leader Annie Lööf has generally failed to meet the expectations of her rank-and-file. A number of controversial suggestions in late 2012 and early 2013, as a part of the attempt to formulate a new party program, have further added to internal opposition.
The right-wing populist Sweden Democrats (SD) have experienced a turbulent period as well, having been heavily monitored in Swedish mainstream media throughout 2012–2013. In November 2012, tabloid Expressen published a video clip of two top SD politicians – Kent Ekeroth and Erik Almqvist, alongside party member Christian Westling – behaving like thugs in the street, dropping uncouth racist and sexist remarks and carrying large iron bars to threaten an opponent. The ‘iron pipe scandal’ evoked a public outcry, and both Ekeroth and Almqvist were given new assignments, but were in the end not forced to leave the parliament. However, at least in the short run, the incident did not alter public support for SD and party leader Jimmie Åkesson.
Policies
The financial crisis in Europe and the ‘between elections’ mood have contributed to the somewhat mundane character of Swedish politics. If anything, 2012 has been a year of political scandals and replacements. In addition to ever-present domestic issues like the economy, unemployment and refugee and family immigration from outside of Europe, the political debate has focused a lot on the welfare sector. The question of profits for companies operating in the public sector, for example health care providers and independent (private) schools have given rise to occasionally heated debates.
The present Swedish foreign policy follows in the footsteps of the 2010 Foreign Policy Statement of the Reinfeldt government. Sweden is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, but for the time being not a contender for NATO membership. Recently, cutbacks in the Armed Forces have provoked some controversy. In spring 2013, the Reinfeldt government and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt faced criticism for not reacting to Russia’s current military build-up. Such accusations have generally been considered to be an attempt on behalf of the opposition to highlight divides within the Alliance.
Economic situation and ant-crisis strategies
Why is Sweden not ‘Greece’, to use the well-known contemporary symbol of a European country struggling to survive in the face of severe economic problems? Prime Minster Reinfeldt and his Minister of Finance Anders Borg have in recent years managed to stand out as credible caretakers during this difficult financial situation, and the Swedish banks have remained more or less intact over the past years, even though various support packages and measures have been introduced by the government. Sweden came out of the early years of the crisis (2008–2009) somewhat shattered, but since 2010, the country’s traditional heavy export industries have been able to capitalise on increasing demand from the global market, and tax cuts and low interest rates have strengthened the domestic market. Still, unemployment remains a serious challenge, and in late 2012 and early 2013 a number of large business enterprises announced huge layoffs. Unemployment is currently about 8 per cent but disproportionally high among young people (15 to 24), presently some 25 per cent. Also, heavy cuts in Swedish welfare state arrangements in recent years (e.g. sick pay and unemployment benefits) have of course come with a certain social price. In conclusion, Sweden is not ‘Greece’, but certainly not immune to the present European sovereign debt crisis.
Sweden and the Baltic Sea Region
In line with the post-war national self-image of a modern Northern European democracy, staying outside of military alliances in peacetime in order to remain neutral in the event of war, Sweden has tried to portray itself as a leader in Baltic Sea co-operation. The country is eager to contribute to peaceful joint Baltic and Northern European initiatives to face common challenges like unemployment, environmental issues and security concerns in the region. Accordingly, prominent politicians have hailed the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) as a project of utmost importance to Sweden.
In reality, Sweden’s actual involvement in the Baltic Sea Region has never been restricted to the EU agenda. For example, from July 2010 to June 2012, Sweden held the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) chairmanship, which provides a platform for intergovernmental co-operation on environmental issues in the region. In line with this, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency co-ordinates, in co-operation with HELCOM, the EUSBSR Priority Area Hazards, in order to prevent hazardous substances from entering the Baltic Sea. Also, there have been a number of national instruments set up in recent years to promote regional co-operation, for example business development, environmental protection and civil society collaboration. The academic Visby programme was set up as early as 1998, and both SIDA’s Baltic Sea Unit (2005) and the business leadership Management Programme (2008) have fostered Baltic Sea co-operation independently of one another. In 2011, the Swedish Institute (SI) was formally given the assignment of focusing on the EUSBSR. However, at the same time, SI was also given an assignment by the government to work with regional co-operation within the framework of the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) as well as within the framework of the EU–Russia partnership.
While this may be seen as a way of uniting a number of independent activities under a single umbrella, making perfect sense for Sweden which has long viewed Russia as the key to successful BSR co-operation, there is always the risk of making practical work too complicated and ultimately watering it down. On the other hand, this compromise is admittedly one way of including the EU and Russia within the same BSR framework, which in the end could benefit both the EU Cohesion and the Neighbourhood Policies.
Outlook
In 2013–2014, Sweden will remain firmly committed to BSR co-operation, both within and beyond the EUSBSR. The country co-ordinates four of the 15 Priority Areas of the EUSBSR, and focuses in particular on three key areas promoted by the Reinfeldt government: protection of the Baltic Sea environment, infrastructural integration and increasing the wealth of the region. In particular, the maritime environment has been highlighted by EU Minister Birgitta Ohlsson as one of the most important issues for Sweden to deal with. In 2013, there will also most likely be a more animated political debate in Sweden, as the main contenders start to prepare for the 2014 European Parliament elections, as well as the September 2014 national parliamentary elections.